The Limitation of Labor Preemption: Survivability of Contract Rights During Employer Lockouts by Gann,, Andrew F., Jr.
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 2 Spring Article 7
The Limitation of Labor Preemption: Survivability
of Contract Rights During Employer Lockouts
Andrew F. Gann, Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Andrew F. Gann, Jr., The Limitation of Labor Preemption: Survivability of Contract Rights During Employer Lockouts, 27 Marq. Sports L.
Rev. 397 (2017)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol27/iss2/7
GANN 27.2 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17 9:59 AM 
 
THE LIMITATION OF LABOR PREEMPTION: 
SURVIVABILITY OF CONTRACT RIGHTS 
DURING EMPLOYER LOCKOUTS 
 
ANDREW F. GANN, JR.* 
 
“In life, as in chess, forethought wins.” 
~Charles Buxton 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2011, the National Football League (NFL) and the National  
Football League Players Association (NFLPA) entered into a situation where 
each side had to choose a legal strategy that would create the best result for its 
organization as the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired.1  This  
single document, the CBA, concerned the entire relationship between the NFL 
and the NFLPA.  After the CBA expired, this single document no longer  
governed the relationship between the employer and employees until the par-
ties agreed upon a new CBA.  Faced with this expiration and the goal of sign-
ing a more favorable CBA, the NFL decided to lockout its players, preventing 
the players from receiving any paychecks until a new CBA was signed.  In re-
sponse, the NFLPA decided to no longer be the bargaining arm of the NFL 
players by disclaiming its interest, allowing the players to bring an antitrust 
violation against the NFL for its lockout strategy.  While facially this strategy 
seemed plausible, the NFL players ultimately lost their antitrust action and 
were forced to sign an arguably less-than-ideal CBA agreement.2  With the 
                                                            
* 2016–2017 Law Clerk to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit; 2015–2016 Law Clerk to the Honorable Norman K. Moon of the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.  I earned my J.D. from the University of 
Virginia School of Law and my B.A. from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.  I 
would like to thank my wife, Russie Gann, and my parents, Andy and Sherrie Gann, for their unwa-
vering love and support.  I would like to thank Professor J. Gordon Hylton for all of his help in allow-
ing me to develop this article.  I would also like to thank the staff of the Marquette Sports Law Re-
view for their help in preparing this article for publication.  
1. Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2011).  Throughout this paper, I will use the terms 
“league” and “team” interchangeably.  While this opening paragraph sets the stage and goal of the 
paper, the following three paragraphs will return to Brady v. NFL and provide a concrete example 
concerning this article’s proposed legal strategy to the 2011 labor dispute. 
2. I must note that nothing in this article should be taken as suggesting any negativity towards the 
NFLPA.  As the recent developments in NFL player concussions has shown, the NFLPA is an inte-
gral part of a player’s life and safety.  This article only produces a framework that could be utilized to 
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history of the 2011 CBA negotiations as the backdrop, this article explores a 
different legal strategy that contracted NFL players could use.  This strategy, 
explained more fully below, would involve the ability of any NFL player with 
a valid contract to bring a state-law-breach-of-contract claim demanding to be 
paid.  This ability to bring state-law-contract claims during a lockout would be 
a complete  
game-changer and allow the NFL players to regain some market control in  
future CBA expirations, ensuring that a fair, market-controlled CBA is agreed 
upon.  Ultimately, this article provides the NFLPA with an alternative strategy 
to fill the void left after the 2011 labor dispute. 
To better understand the dynamic of bringing state-law claims, it is  
important to fully examine the contours of the 2011 labor dispute and provide 
an example of two players who could have utilized this state-law strategy to 
obtain a successful result.  As mentioned above, on March 11, 2011, the CBA 
between the NFL and the NFLPA expired.  On March 12, 2011, the teams  
decided to lockout their players.3  By locking out the players, the teams  
prevented the players from entering their facilities, practicing, or playing any 
games.  To combat this lockout, the players decertified the union4 and brought 
antitrust actions against the teams seeking injunctive relief from the lockout.5  
But, the players were unsuccessful in this action as the Eighth Circuit ultimate-
ly denied their injunction request.6   
Without the ability to obtain an injunction against a lockout, many sports 
analysts have argued that the players will never have a strong bargaining  
position when negotiating a CBA in the future.7  For example, Brady v. NFL 
forced players to accept an arguably unfavorable CBA.  
However, what if this conventional wisdom is wrong?  What if the players 
had a chance to regain bargaining power through an alternative mechanism 
that is the focus of many of their lives—player contracts?  Let us imagine, for  
example, that on March 12, 2011, two famous brothers, Eli and Peyton  
                                                                                                                                               
produce a more favorable CBA in the future.   
3. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663. 
4. This action results in the Union no longer having the ability to bargain on behalf of the players. 
5. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663. 
6. Id. 
7. See generally NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (2011), https://nflpaweb.blob. 
core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf 
[hereinafter CBA].  See Gregg Rosenthal, The CBA in a Nutshell, PROFOOTBALLTALK (July 25, 
2011), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/the-cba-in-a-nutshell/.  These articles could be 
the  
result of the media’s portrayal of the CBA negotiations, which failed to realize any positive clauses 
the NFLPA gained.  However, with that aside, this article strives to ensure that the players are capable 
of signing a more favorable CBA in the future.  
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Manning, decided not to join the action seeking antitrust violations.  Instead, 
suppose the Manning brothers sought state-breach-of-contract claims on 
grounds that their player contracts had been violated by the lockout.8  The  
Manning brothers could have brought suit in the states where they are popular 
public figures, New York and Indiana respectively.  In addition, either judges, 
many of whom are elected, or juries, who would likely be made up of local 
team fans, would decide these cases. 
With this hypothetical lawsuit in mind, this article argues that NFL  
contracted players should consider a breach of contract lawsuit when the CBA 
expires in the future.  In order to elaborate on that argument, this article pro-
ceeds in four parts (with the Introduction being Part I).  Part II of this article 
begins by discussing past labor disputes in the NFL.  This discussion will 
show that the labor disputes in the past have resulted in a flip-flop of bargain-
ing power  
between the teams and players.  With Brady, the power remains in the hands 
of the teams.  Second, it discusses two critical cases: Brown v. Pro Football, 
Inc.,9 and Brady v. NFL.10  Finally, this section analyzes the impact of section 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.11  
Part III examines the possible preemptive effect of section 301.  It begins 
with a broad discussion of the United States Supreme Court case law directly 
involving section 301.  This discussion will show that the Supreme Court 
views section 301’s preemptive effect narrowly.  Part III then turns to sports-
specific case law to demonstrate that player contracts remain valid through 
possible  
labor strife.  One specific case, Williams v. NFL,12 provides strong arguments 
that section 301 does not preempt state law in the sports context, and it pro-
vides a more generalized discussion of section 301 preemption as it specifical-
ly  
relates to state-contract law.   
Part IV explains why this state-contract law exemption should not frighten 
labor law scholars since professional sports athletes are the only viable  
plaintiffs.  This is due to two unique labor situations.  First, professional sports 
                                                            
8. Both of these players had valid contracts that extended into the 2011−2012 season.  Ralph  
Vacchiano, Manning, Giants Agree to Record Contract, NY DAILY NEWS (Aug. 5, 2009), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/giants/giants-eli-manning-richest-qb-nfl-super-bowl-
mvp-agrees-6-year-97-5m-extension-article-1.394959; Albert Breer, Colts Put Franchise Tag on  
Manning While Negotiating New Deal, NFL (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nfl.com/news/story 
/09000d5d81e534e5/article/colts-put-franchise-tag-on-manning-while-negotiating-new-deal.  
9. 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
10. 644 F.3d 661. 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2016). 
12. 582 F.3d at 876−78. 
GANN 27.2 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  9:59 AM 
400 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:2 
athletes are able to sign long-term contracts that extend past the CBA’s  
expiration.  These contracts are highly individualized with the exact term and 
money negotiated for each athlete.13  Second, professional athletes, more  
specifically NFL athletes, are not afforded comparable employment in the 
North American market.  Due to this limited scope, these potential actions 
must be considered a “sporting exception” analog. 
 
II. THE GAME FIELD: UNDERSTANDING THE CONTOURS OF THE FIELD 
 
A. Brief History of NFL Labor Disputes 
 
Before one can understand the importance of this article, the history of 
NFL labor strife must be examined.14  This history begins in 1968, when the 
NFLPA asserted itself as an independent union and the sole bargaining body 
for NFL players.15  Six months after this designation, the players decided that 
they were not receiving proper compensation and initiated a strike.16  Less 
than two weeks later, the strike ended and a new CBA was finalized.17  Unfor-
tunately, many players were still unsatisfied with the salary provisions of this 
new CBA.18    
Two years later, in 1970, the players went on strike again.19  This strike 
was short-lived, however, because the owners threatened cancellation of the  
season.20  With the new four-year CBA adopted that year, the players did not 
have another opportunity to strike until July 1, 1974.  The players demanded 
the “[e]limination of the option clause and ‘Rozelle Rule,’”21 and called for  
impartial arbitration disputes and individualized contracts.22  This time, the 
                                                            
13. As Part IV explains, these individualized contracts may only exist in one other setting: the  
entertainment industry.  
14. For a brief overview of the labor disputes, see Jarrett Bell, Timeline of NFL Labor Disputes, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 12, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-03-03-nfl-
labor-disputes-timeline_N.htm. 
15. See William N. Wallace, The Players Won, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1968. 
16. See William N. Wallace, N.F.L. Players Reject Owner’s Offer: Strike Favored by a 377–17 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011. 
17. See id.  
18. Kevin Nogle, NFL and NFLPA Officially End Labor Negotiations and Sign 10-Year CBA, 
PHINSIDER (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.thephinsider.com/2011/8/6/2347749/nfl-and-nflpa-officially-
end-labor-negotiations-and-sign-10-year-cba.  
19. History, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflpa.com/about/history (last visited May 15, 
2017). 
20. Id. 
21. Id.  The “Rozelle Rule” was also famously litigated in Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 
1976). 
22. History, supra note 19. 
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players returned to the field and played without a new CBA until March 1977.  
This new CBA included some of the players’ requests, such as the impartial 
arbitration, and was set to expire after the 1981 season.23  Two weeks into the 
1982 football season, the players executed a strike, demanding a fixed 55% of 
the league revenues.24  In November 1982, the parties reached a  
tentative settlement, giving the players $1.28 billion over the next five sea-
sons.25  On December 5, 1982, a new CBA was ratified.26   
In 1987, with the 1982 CBA set to expire, the players decided to initiate a 
strike.27  To combat this strike in a different way, the owners began the season 
with replacement players.28  On October 15, 1987, after two weeks of  
replacement player games, the contracted NFL players decided to return to the 
field.29  In addition to ending the strike, the NFLPA filed an antitrust suit.30  In 
Powell v. NFL, the players challenged the first refusal, compensation system, 
and other restrictions that were at issue in prior labor negotiations dating back 
to the early 1970s.31  The district court judge determined that the first refusal, 
compensation system, and standard player contract were not protected labor 
practices because of the expiration of the CBA.32  On appeal, the Eighth Cir-
cuit  
reversed and held that the labor exemption applied because there was an  
“ongoing” collective bargaining relationship.33  In order to combat this deci-
sion, the NFLPA voted to disclaim its interest.34  By disclaiming, the union 
would renounce its representation of the players through the bargaining pro-
cess, thus causing Powell to lose its legal force.35  Subsequently, the players, 
without the NFLPA, filed another lawsuit.36  In McNeil v. NFL, players, whose 
contracts were set to expire after the 1989 season, challenged the same modi-
                                                            
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Bell, supra note 14. 
30. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 778 (D. Minn. 1988). 
31. Id. at 779. 
32. Id. at 788−89. 
33. Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989). 
34. See Bell, supra note 14. 
35. See id. 
36. See generally McNeil v. NFL, No. 4-90-476, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21561, at *1 (D. Minn. 
Sept. 10, 1992). 
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fied free agency system as the Powell litigation.37  After two days of deliberat-
ing, the jury returned a favorable verdict for the players,38 awarding damages 
of $543,000.39  In order to capitalize on this verdict, the players filed another 
suit seeking an injunction against the newly modified free agency system.40  
The district court judge granted the injunction, forcing both sides to negotiate 
a new CBA in 1993 with the players gaining the upper hand.41   
From 1993 to 2008, the labor negotiations continued peacefully with each 
side agreeing to extend the previous CBA.  However, in 2008, the owners  
decided to halt these peaceful labor negotiations as they sought to regain con-
trol and opt out of the final two years of the CBA.42  As a result, the CBA was 
set to expire on March 11, 2011.43  Leading up to this expiration, the league 
owners and players negotiated to no avail.44 Understanding that the deadline 
was going to arrive with no agreement, the owners decided that they would in-
stitute a “lockout” of the “bargaining unit” instead of allowing the players to 
strike first.45  This lockout procedure prevented players from “entering League  
facilities, from receiving any compensation or benefits, and from performing 
any employment duties including playing, practicing, working out, attending 
meetings, making promotional appearances, and consulting medical and  
training personnel.”46  To combat this lockout, the NFLPA once again  
declaimed its interest47 and the players brought suit.48  As the next section  
explains, this action was not successful, and the players lost their bargaining 
power, resulting in a CBA arguably in favor of the owners.49  
In the end, this labor dispute illustrates three important points.  First, it 
                                                            
37. Id. at *2−3.  See Bell, supra note 14. 
38. History, supra note 19. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. (referring to Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992)). 
41. History, supra note 19. 
42. Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 2011).   
43. Id. at 666−67. 
44. Id.  
45. See id. at 668.  This bargaining unit included the “professional football players under contract, 
free agents, and prospective players who have been drafted or entered into negotiations with an NFL 
team.”  Id.  This was a more significant term since the disclaiming interest of the union actually oc-
curred a few hours before the lockout was official.  As the prior history shows, the owners had never  
locked-out the players first.  The owners always responded to the player strike by formally announc-
ing a lockout.  However, this really provided no change to the dynamic.  This was the first time that 
the owners would initiate the conduct, and this strategy would prove to be successful. 
46. Id. 
47. This strategy had worked before.  See History, supra note 19. 
48. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663. 
49. See generally CBA, supra note 7. 
GANN 27.2 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  9:59 AM 
2017]CONTRACT RIGHTS DURING EMPLOYER LOCKOUTS  403 
shows that the players and teams have continued to exchange bargaining con-
trol over the years.  Second, history proves that the mechanisms used have be-
come more legally complicated over time.  In the beginning, the teams used 
scare tactics, including threats, that they would cancel the season.  More re-
cently, the teams have used a very complicated lockout regime that is propped 
up by labor law.50  Lastly, it shows that the teams have regained very powerful 
bargaining control with Brady.   
 
B. The “Brown Period” and Brady v. NFL 
 
In addition to examining the history of labor disputes, one must under-
stand the period within the labor negotiation scheme that this article deals 
with.  The “Brown Period,” as this article concerns, is the negotiation 
timeframe after the CBA has expired and before legal impasse occurs where 
antitrust litigation  
becomes available.  This can best be understood by reviewing two cases.51  In 
Brown, professional football players sought relief through an antitrust action 
against the NFL for unilaterally implementing player contract provisions that 
were not legally agreed upon between the NFL and the players.52  More  
specifically, the action concerned a wage dispute.53  When negotiations over 
the wage issue came to an impasse, the owners agreed, without the players un-
ion involvement, to implement the wage contract provisions that were a result 
of the last reasonable negotiation effort.54  The players argued that these uni-
lateral changes violated antitrust laws under the Sherman Act.55  Relying on 
prior sports precedent,56 the Supreme Court determined that the unilateral 
changes did not violate the Sherman Act.57  Moreover, the Supreme Court em-
braced a broader notion that action taken place as a result of the implementa-
tion of the CBA would be exempt from federal antitrust law and thus be gov-
erned by  
federal labor laws, even if the agreement expired.58  This decision has been  
understood as implementing a period of time called the “Brown Period,” dur-
ing which federal labor laws, rather than federal antitrust provisions, govern 
                                                            
50. One reason for this complexity and sophistication is the fact that the NFLPA has become 
stronger over the past decade.  
51. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Brady, 644 F.3d at 661. 
52. Brown, 518 U.S. at 233−34. 
53. Id. at 235. 
54. Id.  
55. Id. 
56. See generally Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
57. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250. 
58. See id.  
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the NFL’s action.   
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court decided another case that solidified 
the boundaries of the “Brown Period.”59  In Brady, the NFL players brought 
suit, claiming that the 2011 lockout, discussed above, violated federal antitrust 
laws.60  More specifically, the players sought a preliminary injunction, claim-
ing that “the lockout [was] an unlawful group boycott that was causing irrepa-
rable harm to the Players.”61  When the district court granted the injunction, 
the NFL teams appealed to the Eighth Circuit.62   
In holding that the injunction violated the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the 
Eighth Circuit provided an expanded view of Brown.  After restating the fac-
tors  
significant in Brown,63 the court analyzed the specific case facts with these  
factors in the backdrop.  Most importantly, the court held that the “Brown  
Period” extended to the specific facts of this case.64  Although the district court 
had reasoned that both parties had foregone traditional labor law negotiations, 
the Eighth Circuit held that the labor law protections extended well beyond 
this abandonment.65  
In the end, Brown and Brady established the playing field for this article.  
This playing field is the “Brown Period”—after the CBA expiration but before 
traditional impasse.  During this timeframe, NFL teams are allowed to lockout 
its players and prevent them from working.  Furthermore, the Brady case  
provided that this timeframe can be extended well beyond the time those  
traditional negotiations ceased.  Left with no other option, NFL players would 
have two choices during this “Brown Period”: either sit out from playing and 
not get paid, or agree to a less than optimal CBA.  With only these two op-
tions, it is easy to see why the 2011 CBA resulted in arguably unfavorable 
terms for the players.66  But, if state-contract-law claims become viable, a third  
option would be provided to these players during the “Brown Period.” 
                                                            
59. See Brady v. NFL, 644 F.3d 661, 663 (8th Cir. 2011).   
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 665−66 (“The Supreme Court held that the non[-]statutory labor exemption applied to 
the employer conduct at issue, which (1) took place during and immediately after a collective-
bargaining negotiation, (2) grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the bar-
gaining process, (3) involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively, and (4) 
concerned only the parties to the collective-bargaining relationship.”). 
64. See id. at 682. 
65. Id. at 668, 682. 
66. See generally CBA, supra note 7. 
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C. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
 
Now that the labor dispute history and “Brown Period” have been  
explained, the last area of background is the relevant statutory language.  Part I 
explained that labor law scholars would quickly trash this article thinking that 
federal labor law preempts state-contract-law claims.  The basis for this  
argument comes from section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, as 
codified at 29 U.S.C. §185(a), which states as follows:  
 
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship.  Suits for violation of 
contracts between an employer and a labor organization  
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as 
defined in this [Act], or between any such labor organizations, 
may be brought in any district court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in  
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the par-
ties.67 
 
Although this language does not provide guidance or analysis on the 
preemptive effect,68 the language itself can help recognize what exactly the 
United States Supreme Court is interpreting in the next section.69    
 
III. PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF SECTION 301 
 
A. Section 301 Supreme Court Precedent  
 
Preemption occurs when a federal statute displaces a state statute.70   
Because the federal and state government run concurrently in numerous areas, 
the doctrine of preemption has become a vitally important principle.71   
Originally, preemption was viewed as an arm of the Supremacy Clause.72   
                                                            
67. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2016). 
68. The United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of this language will be thoroughly exam-
ined in the next section.   
69. Furthermore, the language of the statute will become important in Part III.C.  In that subsec-
tion, I will generally discuss section 301 preemption as it specifically pertains to state-contract law.  
For this discussion, I will dispose of the idea of express preemption.  This is clear because the lan-
guage shows that there is no express preemption clause.  Even the language itself, suits “may be 
brought” is not an affirmative requirement. 
70. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2000) (and sources cited therein). 
71. See id. at 225. 
72. Id. at 234. 
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However, this view has been displaced.  Leading scholars, such as Caleb  
Nelson, have reversed this view, and preemption is now firmly placed within 
the framework of statutory interpretation.73  To understand the preemptive 
scope of section 301, the applicable Supreme Court case law must be ana-
lyzed.74 
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, the  
Supreme Court received its first opportunity to analyze section 301.75  There, 
the union and employer entered into a CBA that was to run from  
year-to-year unless terminated with specific notice.76  The agreement also  
provided that “there would be no strikes or work stoppages and that grievances 
would be handled pursuant to a specified procedure.”77  Soon after, many  
grievances arose out of concern for workloads and work assignments.78  After 
the employer refused to utilize the specified procedures required in the CBA to 
solve these grievances, the union brought suit.79  After reviewing section 301, 
the Court held that section 301 is more than merely a jurisdictional statute.80  
Instead, the statute “authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law 
for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements.”81  Therefore, 
the federal district court could not only adjudicate the suit, but could also  
provide proper remedial measures.82 
                                                            
73. Id. at 265. 
74. In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, the Court discussed the possible preemp-
tion of the NLRA in connection with the Board authority.  While this could have some bearing on this 
case, Garmon preemption does not apply because nothing in this article’s state-contract-law claim 
would question the NLRB or possible unfair labor practices.  San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 359 
U.S. at 239.  This was the significance in Joe Caldwell’s case in which he claimed that the ABA’s 
unfair labor practices were a tort violation.  See Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 66 F.3d 523, 
525 (2d Cir. 1995).  However, Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass’n, Inc. resulted directly from a 
valid CBA which gave the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction.  Id. at 527.  Furthermore, the state-tort claim 
imposed duties on the parties that are outside the scope of duties voluntarily invoked on the teams.  
See id.  This practical difference will be further explained in Part III.C.  In that section, I will explain 
how state-contract law just provides a forum to adjudicate the claims that the parties voluntarily 
agreed upon.  This  
‘voluntariness’ element is a significant distinguishing factor with possible everlasting effects.  As the 
section will provide, no one will argue that the owners are: 1) required to lockout the players or 2) 
required to agree to these contractual obligations outside of the CBA.  By doing these actions, the 
owners could arguably be waiving their protections. 
75. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449−51 (1957). 
76. Id. at 449. 
77. Id.  
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 450–51. 
81. Id. at 451. 
82. Id. at 451−52. 
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Less than five years later, the Supreme Court faced another opportunity to 
determine section 301’s meaning.83  In Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Co., an employee was 
discharged after causing damage to the employer’s equipment.84  After being 
discharged, the union questioned this action and received notice that the  
employee had been discharged due to unsatisfactory work.85  Due to this  
response, the union called a strike to get the employee rehired.86  After the  
eight-day strike, the issue was submitted to an arbitration board, which  
ultimately agreed with the employer.87  In addition, the employer brought suit 
in Washington state court requesting damages for lost business.88  After  
determining that the state court was not preempted jurisdictionally or  
substantively, the Court held that the “strike was a violation of the collective 
bargaining contract” and awarded damages.89  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
reviewed “whether § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
deprives state courts of jurisdiction over the litigation.”90  Easily disposing of 
this question, the Court held that section 301 does not preclude state courts 
from taking jurisdiction over cases that involve the possible interpretation of 
CBAs.91   
However, the Court did not stop at the jurisdictional question, and moved 
to a discussion of the substantive question.  Relying on Lincoln Mills, the 
Court held that the state court, although obtaining jurisdiction over the action, 
must substantively apply federal common law when ruling on conduct within 
the  
statute.92  A contrary rule, according to the Court, would completely under-
mine the entire scheme and provide for possible different interpretations of the 
CBA in different jurisdictions.93  The Court further expanded this view seven 
                                                            
83. See generally Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas 
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
84. Id. at 97. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 97−98. 
90. Id. at 101. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 103. 
93. See id. (“The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal 
labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute.  Comprehensiveness is inherent in the 
process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues 
raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor pol-
icy.”). 
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years later.94  In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, International Ass’n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, the Court held that these actions, which fall 
into the  
purview of the federal substantive law, are ripe for removal to federal court 
with compliance of the removal statute.95 
While the precedent clearly shows that federal common law is warranted 
when the action falls within section 301, it does not provide clear guidance on 
how to determine whether state-law claims are preempted entirely.  In 1985, 
the Court began to clarify this point.96  In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the 
Court had to determine whether “the state[-]tort claim is preempted by the na-
tional labor laws” when concerning disability plans.97  The facts showed that 
the  
employee had lost his disability benefits due to the employer’s numerous late 
payments.98  Although the CBA provided a grievance mechanism for this type 
of conduct, the employee never attempted this mechanism and instead brought 
suit in state court.99  On appeal, the Court held that section 301 preempted the 
state-law claim because the clause directly related to the CBA.100  However, 
the Supreme Court held that state-law rights and obligations that exist  
independently within a private contract are not preempted.101  Furthermore, the 
                                                            
94. See generally Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace  
Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 
95. Id. at 560. 
96. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 203 (1985). 
97. Id.  
98. Id. at 205. 
99. Id. at 206. 
100. Id. at 210−11. 
 
The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that labor-contract 
disputes be resolved by reference to federal law also require that the meaning given a  
contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal interpretation.  Thus, questions  
relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences 
were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to 
uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of 
contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.  Any other result would elevate form over 
substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract 
claims as claims for tortious breach of contract. 
 
Id. at 211. 
101. Id. at 213. 
 
 Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist independently of private 
agreements, and that as a result can be waived or altered by agreement of private parties, 
are pre-empted by those agreements.  Cf. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. [497,] 
504−505 (NLRA pre-emption).  Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin 
tort action for breach of the duty of good faith as applied here confers non[-]negotiable 
state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by  
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Court noted the limited scope of section 301 preemption: 
 
 Of course, not every dispute concerning employment, or 
tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining 
agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the 
federal labor law.  Section 301 on its face says nothing about 
the substance of what private parties may agree to in a labor 
contract.  Nor is there any suggestion that Congress, in  
adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive provisions of 
private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any  
inconsistent state regulation.  Such a rule of law would dele-
gate to unions and unionized employers the power to exempt  
themselves from whatever state labor standards they  
disfavored.102 
 
 While Allis-Chalmers Corp. disposed of the case at hand, the Court failed 
to provide a clear standard to apply in future preemption cases.  However, the 
Court provided this standard three years later.103  In Lingle v. Norge Division 
of Magic Chef, Inc., the employee brought charges under state-tort law against 
her employer for retaliatory discharge.104  Because the CBA provided “her 
with a contractual remedy for discharge without just cause,”105 the federal dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint, holding that it was preempted by the 
CBA’s  
provision.106  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.107  
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.  While the district court had held that 
the state-law claim was “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA, the Court  
disagreed, holding that none of the elements of the retaliatory discharge 
claimed required interpretation of the CBA.108  Under the Illinois retaliatory 
discharge claim, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s burden required that she 
prove: “‘(1) [that] [s]he was discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) 
                                                                                                                                               
contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with 
consideration of the terms of the labor contract.  If the state[-]tort law purports to define 
the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-empted. 
 
Id. 
102. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 211−12. 
103. See generally Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
104. Id. at 401. 
105. Id.  
106. Id.  Her suit was in federal court because it had been promptly removed by the employer 
from Illinois state court. 
107. Id.  
108. Id. at 407. 
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the employer’s motive in discharging or threatening to discharge [her] was to 
deter [her] from exercising [her] rights.’”109  According to the Court, “[n]either 
of th[os]e  
elements requires a court to interpret any term of a [CBA].”110  Furthermore, 
the Court fleshed out the argument relating to the use of the CBA as an ele-
ment of the state claim, stating that “[a]lthough the state-law analysis might 
involve  
attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination 
whether petitioner was fired for just cause, such parallelism does not ren-
der the state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis.”111    
Since Lingle, courts have held this independent versus dependent rationale 
as a significant distinction in determining section 301 preemption.112  For  
example, in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, the employee brought a  
retaliatory discharge suit after bringing a grievance concerning his  
employment.113  After the employee requested that a piece of equipment be  
replaced to prevent future injury and his supervisor denied this request, the  
employee was suspended pending a termination hearing.114  In determining 
that the state-law claim was not preempted, the Court held:  
 
The CBA is not the “only source” of respondent's right not to 
be discharged wrongfully.  In fact, the “only source” of the 
right respondent asserts in this action is state[-]tort law. Whol-
ly apart from any provision of the CBA, petitioners had a 
state-law  
obligation not to fire respondent in violation of public policy 
or in retaliation for whistle-blowing.  The parties' obligation 
under the RLA to arbitrate disputes arising out of the applica-
tion or interpretation of the CBA did not relieve petitioners of 
                                                            
109. Id. (quoting Horton v. Miller Chem. Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1985)) (discussing 
the retaliatory discharge cause of action).  For an Illinois Supreme Court case explaining the retaliato-
ry discharge cause of action elements, see generally Gonzalez v. Prestress Eng’g Corp., 503 N.E.2d 
308 (Ill. 1986).  
110. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407.   
111. Id. at 400. 
112. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 257 (1994).  See also Livadas v. Brad-
shaw, 512 U.S. 107, 120 (1994) (holding that a state-law claim is not preempted because the obliga-
tions and rights existed independent of the CBA); Thompson v. Hibbing Taconite Holding Co., No. 
08-868 (JRT/RLE), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87045, at *11 (D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2008) (“[V]iolat[ions] 
[of] such non-negotiable state law rights [which did] not require an interpretation of the CBA, and 
would not be preempted under the LMRA.”). 
113. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 512 U.S. at 249−50. 
114. Id. 
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this duty.115 
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions discussed above can be summarized as  
embracing three overarching principles.  First, section 301’s preemption  
purpose is to ensure that CBA provisions are interpreted under the same  
principles from state to state.116  Second, section 301’s preemptive scope is  
limited117 to only those state-law principles that require an explicit interpreta-
tion of, or understood as being “inextricably intertwined” with, the CBA.118  
Finally, this preemption does not extend to any state-law claim that provides 
rights and obligations outside the CBA.119   
Applying these principles to NFL players’ state-law-contract claims after 
the expiration of the CBA, it can easily be argued that section 301, in light of 
precedent, is not preemptive.  This preemption failure can be explained by  
analyzing the prior precedent as it applies to the NFL.  First, this situation  
presents a scenario that is distinguishable from the prior preemption case law.  
In each of the prior cases, a valid CBA existed with specified provisions  
concerning the conduct at hand.  In Brady, the CBA was no longer valid as it 
had expired.  In addition, the CBA provided no specified language concerning 
the individualized contracts.120  Second, section 301’s preemption could not 
possibly be interpreted to extend to the situation discussed here.  The  
state-contract-law claim would neither require an explicit interpretation of the 
CBA nor would it be “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA.  Each of these  
individualized contracts provides a stand-alone obligation that was individual-
ly negotiated between each player121 and each team.  For example, in 2009, the 
New York Giants and Eli Manning entered into a six-year contract exten-
sion.122  Both parties agreed to these terms knowing the agreement would ex-
tend well beyond the 2011 CBA expiration.123  This agreement does not re-
quire the CBA for interpretation, nor is it “inextricably intertwined.”124  At no 
                                                            
115. Id. at 258. 
116. This does not mean that state courts are stripped of the ability to adjudicate these claims.   
Instead, it provides the substantive law used in this adjudication.  
117. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).  
118. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408 (1988). 
119. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 512 U.S. at 257. 
120. Only two provisions could arguably even be used: the Preamble and Appendix A.  However, 
both of these provisions are very bare and do not provide any substantive rules regarding this issue. 
121. This is one reason why player agents have become so important over recent years. 
122. Vacchiano, supra note 8.  
123. See id. 
124. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408 (1988).  Furthermore, any  
interpretation of the CBA would be totally tangential and irrelevant to the actual claim as the Lingle v. 
Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. Court explained: “[T]he state-law analysis might well involve  
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point would  
either Manning or the New York Giants argue that the CBA expiration  
invalidated the 2009 contract.  Furthermore, neither party argued that the par-
ties should execute a new agreement with the new 2011 CBA.  Third, it is 
clear that the player contracts provide rights and obligations clearly outside the 
CBA.  As the Eli Manning example proves, the contract provides stand-alone 
rights and obligations that extend well past the expiration of one CBA into the 
validation of another.  If the contractual provisions were dependent upon the 
CBA, the parties would not validly be allowed to enter into contracts beyond 
the CBA’s expiration.  Furthermore, the contracting parties, such as Manning 
and the New York Giants, would be required to execute a new agreement upon 
the new CBA’s signing. 
In the end, the Supreme Court precedent cannot be interpreted to preempt 
the state-contract-law claims.  While section 301’s preemptive effect in some 
situations has been accepted, the Court has narrowed such situations to where 
the CBA either must be interpreted or that the issue involved is “inextricably 
intertwined” with the CBA.  With neither of these scenarios applying, the  
state-law-contract claim must be allowed to proceed against section 301’s  
backdrop. 
 
B. Significant Sports-Specific Case Law  
 
i. Contract Claim Viability: Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey  
 
In addition to the Supreme Court case law concerning section 301, two 
sports specific cases complement the non-preemption argument.  The first case 
provides that even the NFL teams understand that these professional player  
contracts remain enforceable throughout labor strife, whether it is a lockout or 
strike, and continue to be valid after a new CBA is signed.125   
In Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, an NFL team sought preliminary 
and permanent injunctions against one of its players who sought to play for a 
team in the newly organized World Football League (WFL).126  The WFL was 
an American football league that sprung up for the 1974 season.  While the 
WFL held a college draft in 1974, it also pursued established NFL players for 
future contractual years.127  Signing such players, in the eyes of the WFL, 
                                                                                                                                               
attention to the same factual considerations as the contractual determination of whether Lingle was 
fired for just cause.  But we disagree with the court's conclusion that such parallelism renders the  
state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis.”  Id.  
125. See generally Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129 (S.D. Ohio 1974). 
126. Id. at 131. 
127. Id. at 132−33. 
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would garner “credibility” for the league.128  Although Bergey was contracted 
with the  
Cincinnati Bengals through the 1974 season, he signed a personal service  
contract with a WFL team, the Virginia Ambassadors.129  This contract pro-
vided that Bergey “shall commence playing professional football for the Vir-
ginia  
Ambassadors in May[] 1976.”130  Disapproving of this contract, the Bengals 
brought suit.131   
While the Bengals were denied the preliminary injunction, the court’s  
decision relates to preemption issues in two ways.  First, the Bengals were  
unconcerned about the future labor strife that was surely on the horizon in ear-
ly 1974.  Furthermore, neither party argued during the litigation that the possi-
bility of a future strike could invalidate the Bengals’ contract with Bergey.132  
Second, the Bengals were also concerned with enforcing a contract that surely 
would extend into a new CBA.  Because the CBA would expire in July 1974, 
the  
Bengals were seeking to enforce a contract, Bergey’s 1974–75 player contract, 
which would be enforceable only during the new CBA.  This proves that nei-
ther the Bengals nor anyone else argued that the new CBA would require the 
parties to execute a new contract.   
In the end, Bergey strongly suggests that the player contracts remain valid 
during labor strife.133  These labor “protests” do not affect the contract’s valid-
ity and provide enforceable provisions during the “Brown Period.”134  
 
ii. Williams v. NFL 
 
The second principle concerns the interplay between section 301 and the 
                                                            
128. Id. at 133. 
129. Id.  
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 131. 
132. It is possible that the Bengals feared Bergey would jump to the WFL during the strike, how-
ever, this fear has nothing to do with the validity of the contract. 
133. It also proves the arguments that were made in the prior section.  See Part III.A (discussing 
Eli Manning and the Giants). 
134. In order for the NFL to argue otherwise, they would have to provide a flip-flop argument.  In 
Cincinnati Bengals v. Bergey, the Bengals clearly understood that Bergey’s contract would be  
enforceable regardless of the potential 1974 strike.  See Bergey, 453 F. Supp. at 148.  Furthermore, 
and somewhat oddly, the Bengals argued that the contract was enforceable against the potential nego-
tiation of future contracts—even ones beyond the expiration of the current player’s contract.  Id. at 
143. 
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NFL.135  In Williams v. NFL, Kevin and Pat Williams, after both testing posi-
tive for banned substances and receiving suspensions, brought suit against the 
NFL, citing Minnesota statutory and common law claims related to drug test-
ing.136  In the district court, section 301 was deemed not preemptive over the 
claims  
supported through Minnesota’s Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace 
Act (DATWA); yet, the state-tort-law claims were preempted.137  Each party  
appealed.138 
Beginning with the Minnesota statutory claims, the district court held that 
these claims were not “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA.139  On appeal, 
the NFL argued that Minnesota’s DATWA140 was preempted for three rea-
sons.  First, “the claim[s] turn[ed] on [the] analysis of the Policy in order to 
determine whether it ‘meets or exceeds’ DATWA’s requirements.”141  Second, 
“the claim requires interpretation of the Policy in order to determine whether 
the NFL  
qualifie[d] as an employer under DATWA such that the statute’s protections 
extend to the Players.”142  Finally, the NFL argued that preemption is neces-
sary because the “uniform interpretation of the CBA/Policy is necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the NFL’s business as a national organization.”143  
Reviewing these arguments, the Eighth Circuit began with section 301’s Su-
preme Court precedent.144  The court noted that this precedent proves that sec-
tion 301’s preemptive power is limited.145  With that limited scope on the hori-
zon, the court turned to the claims themselves.146  In order to determine the 
                                                            
135. See Williams v. NFL, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009).  See generally Dana A. Gittleman, Home 
Field Advantage: Determining the Appropriate “Turf” for Williams v. National Football League and 
Clarifying Preemption Precedent, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 203 (2012). 
136. Williams, 582 F.3d at 872. 
137. Id. at 873. 
138. Id. 
139. See id. at 872–73.  
140. Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 181.950−957 
(2016). 
141. Williams, 582 F.3d at 873. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 874.  “However, the Court has established that section 301 does not preempt state-law 
claims merely because the parties involved are subject to a CBA and the events underlying the claim 
occurred on the job.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “Of course, not every dispute concerning employment, 
or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 . . . 
.”  Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). 
146. Id. 
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preemption, the court cited a two-prong test provided in an earlier case: 
 
First, a “state-law claim is preempted if it is ‘based on’ a . . . 
provision of the CBA,” meaning that “the CBA provision at 
issue” actually sets forth the right upon which the claim is 
based.  Second, section 301 preemption applies where a  
state-law claim “is ‘dependent upon an analysis’ of the rele-
vant CBA,” meaning that the plaintiff's state-law claim re-
quires  
interpretation of a provision of the CBA.147 
 
For the first prong, the court held that the claim at issue is “predicated on 
Minnesota law.”148  While the action concerned a clause found in the CBA, 
Minnesota state law determined the action itself.  Furthermore, the state law 
provided that the CBA could contract around these provisions as long as the 
minimum, or floor, was maintained.149  For the second prong, the court held 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has distinguished those [claims] which require  
interpretation or construction of the CBA from those which only require  
reference to it.”150  Furthermore, the court noted “‘the crucial inquiry is wheth-
er “resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a CBA.”’”151  
With this framework, the court held that the NFL could not point to a single 
provision within the CBA that must be interpreted.152   
After upholding the district court’s decision that the Minnesota statutory 
claims were not preempted, the court turned to the state-common-law-tort 
claims.153  Once again, the court reasoned that the same test must be applied.154  
This time, however, the outcome resulted in preemption based on the fact that 
the duties required under these tort claims “cannot be determined without  
examining the parties’ legal relationship and expectations as established by the 
CBA.”155  Thus, the court reasoned that these claims were “inextricably  
                                                            
147. Id. (quoting Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
148. Id. at 878. 
149. See id. 
150. Id. at 876 (citations omitted). 
151. Id. at 877 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405−06 (1988)). 
152. Id.  The court noted that the NFL could argue that the Preamble covered this conduct, but 
such argument would be a reach.  See id. 
153. Id. at 880−81. 
154. Id. at 881. 
155. Id.  
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intertwined with consideration of the terms of the [CBA].”156 
The Williams case perfectly shows the opposite ends of the spectrum and 
allows the state-law claims after the expiration of the CBA, which are at issue 
in this article, to be analyzed.  With that being said, the state-law-contract 
claims at issue in this article resemble Minnesota’s DATWA claims more than 
the  
Minnesota state-tort law.  First, these contracts are agreed upon individually.  
With such individual, stand-alone contracts, the claim at issue would be  
dependent upon the contract itself rather than the CBA.  Furthermore, no  
provision of the CBA would have to be interpreted to succeed on these  
state-law claims.  As with the Minnesota’s DATWA claims, in a lawsuit based 
on multi-year player contracts, the NFL cannot point to one provision of the 
CBA, outside of the Preamble and other sprinkled unclear provisions, that 
would influence the contract claim that the Williams court disavowed.  With 
no provision, the state-contract-law claims would pass the single most crucial  
inquiry, “‘whether “resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning 
of a CBA.”’”157  In this case, the state-contract-law claim would not be  
dependent upon anything but the contract terms themselves.158  
 
C. General Preemption Discussion159 
 
i. Express Preemption 
 
Although section 301-specific case law provides sufficient arguments that 
state-contract claims are not preempted, a more generalized discussion of 
                                                            
156. Id.  The same analysis was very similar for the other tort claims.  Id.  
157. Id. at 877 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405−06 (1988)). 
158. In addition to these claims, it can also be reasoned that the state-contract-law claim is actual-
ly more independent from the CBA than the drug testing at issue in Williams v. NFL.  No one would 
argue that the NFL could drug test any of its players once the CBA has expired.  Furthermore, the 
ability to test players would not be restored until the new CBA was agreed upon and executed.  How-
ever, this is not the case with the contract.  As mentioned in prior sections, the contract remains a val-
id stand-alone agreement after the CBA’s expiration.  Once the new CBA is executed, no player is 
forced to sign a new contract.  Therefore, the player contracts would be more independent than any 
drug testing policy at issue.  In addition, as Part III.C will explain, the state-contract-law provides no 
duties or obligations.  It is only a passive statute that can only come into play when parties have vol-
untarily agreed to the provisions of a contract.  At no point would the state-contract-law provide a 
cause of action without a valid contract.  This is very different from the Minnesota law at issue in Wil-
liams.  The Minnesota law provided a floor that could not be contracted around.  This law would pro-
vide a cause of action  
regardless of any other provision. 
159. This general discussion will follow the rubric of preemption as Caleb Nelson expounds upon 
in his textbook.  See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 813–90 (2011).   
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preemption is warranted.  This discussion will close any loopholes from the 
prior cases.160  Furthermore, this general discussion will provide analysis for 
each preemption group.  This is also important because case law provides that 
the failure of one preemptive group does not foreclose the success of anoth-
er.161 
The best place to begin this discussion is with express preemption.  While 
express preemption is hard to overcome, it is the easiest to recognize.162  As 
Part II.C recognizes, section 301 provides no express preemption clause.  
Without this clause, section 301 cannot expressly preempt the state-contract-
law claim. 
 
ii. Implied Preemption 
 
After determining that no express preemption clause is included, implied 
preemption must be analyzed.  Implied preemption can be broken into two 
groups: field and conflict.163  Conflict preemption can further be broken into 
four more groups: impossibility, obvious contradictions, wholly precluded  
activity, and obstacle preemption.164   
Beginning with field preemption, a federal statute is deemed field  
preemptive if it “occupies the field.”165  While this type of preemption is  
significant,166 courts are reluctant to find field preemption.167  As for section 
301, the Supreme Court has already determined that it does not occupy the 
field.  In Allis-Chalmers Corp., the Court clearly stated “[o]f course, not every 
dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a  
collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of 
the federal labor law.”168  This language alone proves that section 301 is not 
field preemptive.  Furthermore, other cases prove section 301 does not occupy 
                                                            
160. Furthermore, it will provide more analysis of why Garmon preemption would fail.  See Tex-
tile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957). 
161. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000).  Although the express 
preemption clause failed to preempt the state-law claim, the claim was still preempted under the con-
flict preemption inquiry.  Id. at 869. 
162. See e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 322 (2008). 
163. NELSON, supra note 159, at 847. 
164. See id. at 852−53. 
165. See id. at 847−48. 
166. If federal law is deemed to be field preemptive, the state cannot pass any law within the en-
tire “field.”  See id. at 851.   
167. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 237 (1947) (describing the factors that 
must be considered when determining field preemption). 
168. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). 
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the field.169 
With field preemption disposed of, we must next turn to conflict  
preemption.  While conflict preemption contains four subcategories, obstacle 
preemption would be the major battleground for these state-contract law-
suits.170  Obstacle preemption analysis begins with breaking up the potential 
“obstacle” into two subcategories: purpose and effect.171  As for purpose, it is 
clearly true that the state-contract law has no purpose to conflict with the fed-
eral labor law.  Most of these state-contract laws come from common law that 
dates back well before section 301’s passing and any federal-labor laws. 
While the purposiveness analysis was determinative in prior case law,172 
the Supreme Court determined that effect could undercut the lack of pur-
pose.173  Therefore, we must consider the effect of the state-contract-law 
claims.  On their face, it seems clear that these state-contract-law claims could 
result in the NFL teams paying players for their contracts or disposing of the 
lockout strategy; however, this “effect” must be analyzed more thoroughly.  
While these claims could bring the end of the lockout, it is not the state law 
itself that has the result.  The state law is completely passive and unenforcea-
ble unless parties voluntarily agree to the contract provisions.  Only after this 
agreement is executed will the state law gain teeth for the athletes to bring suit.  
However, the “teeth” are based on the contract itself rather than state law.  
Therefore, it is the contract that  
provides the obstacle rather than the state-contract law.  This analysis proved 
to be important for the Supreme Court.174  In American Airlines, Inc. v. 
Wolens, the Court recognized the difference between enforcing the “parties’ 
                                                            
169. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 255−56 (1994); Williams v. NFL, 582 
F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2009); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 134−35 (1994); Thompson v.  
Hibbing Taconite Holding Co., No. 08-868 (JRT/RLE), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87045, at *13 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 24, 2008).  
170. As obstacle preemption will show, state-contract law is passive and does not provide any 
rights or obligations outside of the contract.  Due to this significant fact, the state law cannot be 
deemed, upon its own force, to make an action impossible, provide obvious contradictions, or wholly 
preclude an activity.  Furthermore, the NFL has voluntarily agreed to these contractual provisions.  If 
the NFL felt that locking out players was significant, they can certainly include that provision within 
the contract.  Part VI will discuss this more thoroughly. 
171. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“Our primary function is to determine 
whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [state] law stands as an obstacle to the  
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”). 
172. See Kesler v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Fin. Responsibility Div., State of Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 154 
(1962) (finding that lack of purpose of the state statue was determinative in finding no preemption); 
Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 39−40 (1941) (finding that lack of purpose of the state statue was  
determinative in finding no preemption). 
173. See e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651−52 (1971). 
174. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228−29 (1995). 
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own,  
self-imposed undertakings” rather than “state-imposed obligations.”175   
Furthermore, the Court held that preemption did not prevent the states from 
“hold[ing] parties to their [own] agreements.”176  In 2014, the Supreme Court 
once again recognized the importance of this distinction.177 
With Wolens in mind, these state-contract laws do not impose any  
obligations upon the NFL or the players.  These obligations are the parties’ 
“own, self-imposed undertakings.”178  Furthermore, this line of analysis can be 
further explained.  While on its face, the state-contract-law claims appear to 
prevent the NFL from locking out its contracted players, the NFL’s inability to 
initiate a lockout is better understood as a result of its own initiative.  For  
example, the NFL would never argue that it “must” lockout players upon the 
CBA’s expiration.  Furthermore, the NFL would argue that it could contract 
away its lockout rights if it felt necessary.179  Therefore, in practical terms, the 
NFL has chosen to contract away its right to lock out the players on the front 
end—before the CBA expires.  By signing players to an extended contract past 
the CBA’s impending expiration, these teams have decided that these players, 
like Eli Manning, are more important than the possible lockout in the future.180 
In the end, Part III shows that it is arguable that section 301 does not 
preempt state-contract-law claims through three lines of analysis.  First, the  
section 301-specific precedent has been evaluated to prove that section 301’s 
preemption is narrow.  Second, the sports-specific precedent has been evaluat-
ed to show that these player contracts remain valid through labor strife.  The  
Williams case also provides two sports-specific data points to compare these 
state-contract claims.  Finally, this subsection argues that the general discus-
sion of preemption results in state-contract-law claims not being preempted. 
 
IV. ULTIMATE SPORTING EXCEPTION ANALOG 
 
                                                            
175. Id. at 228. 
176. Id. at 229. 
177. Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1431 (2014) (“With these preliminary issues behind 
us, we turn to the central issue in this case, i.e., whether respondent’s implied covenant claim is based 
on a state-imposed obligation or simply one that the parties voluntarily undertook.  Petitioners urge us 
to hold that implied covenant claims are always pre-empted, and respondent suggests that such claims 
are generally not pre-empted, but the reasoning of [American Airlines, Inc. v.] Wolens neither dooms 
nor spares all such claims.”).  
178. Am. Airlines, Inc., 513 U.S. at 228. 
179. NFL teams could negotiate this provision as a trade-off for something else the teams deem 
more valuable.  An example contract provision is: “at no point in the future upon expiration of this 
agreement, the NFL will not lockout its players.”  
180. If this is not the case, Part VI will discuss possible ways to combat this effect. 
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If taken seriously, the last section provided, at the very least, arguable 
grounds that state-contract-law claims could remain viable with labor law 
preemption.  However, in order to prove to labor law scholars that this labor 
law preemption exception will not ruin the federal labor law regime, this sec-
tion will provide that these state-law-contract claims are ultimately nestled un-
der a tight “sporting exception” rubric.181 
 The “sporting exception” verbose was first introduced in Europe.182  This 
so-called exception rose out of the “specificity of sport[s].”183  With sports’  
markets being unique, the exception provides sports “with its own complex 
structure of regulation and dispute resolution” that “merits a reserved domain 
of authority beyond EU supervision and regulation.”184  As described, the 
sporting exception was originally thought to be a blanket exception.  However, 
the  
exception no longer provides blanket immunity from European law;  
rather a case-by-case analysis to determine the applicability of general law.185  
As Stephen Weatherill famously described, 
 
In my view the correct way to understand the so-called  
“sporting exception” in EC law is simply to regard it as the 
space allowed to sports governing bodies to show that their 
rules, which in principle fall within the EC Treaty where they 
have economic effects, represent an essential means to protect 
and promote the special character of sport.  There is no blan-
ket immunity.  There is case-by-case scrutiny.  EC law ap-
plies, but does not (necessarily) condemn.186 
 
While Europe has thrived on this exception, the American sports’ model 
has not followed the same open concept.  However, America does have a few  
                                                            
181. As mentioned in the subsection title, this is not truly equivalent to the sporting exception.  As 
explained below, the sporting exception connotes a situation where sports, as an industry, provide a 
unique circumstance to where normal legal principles do not apply.  In this case, sports itself does not 
provide this unique circumstance; rather it is the extended contracts that the players enter that pro-
vides this circumstance.  However, as argued below, professional sports, specifically the NFL, pro-
vide unique situations that allow these circumstances to flourish. 
182. A whole book is dedicated to the discussion of the sporting exception.  See generally 
RICHARD PARRISH & SAMULI MIETTINEN, THE SPORTING EXCEPTION IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
(2008). 
183. JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER & STEPHEN F. ROSS, HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 
89 (2011). 
184. Id.  
185. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 
E.C.R. I-04921. 
186. PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 182, at vii. 
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isolated situations that easily could fit into this rubric as an analog.  The most 
historic would be the antitrust exemption afforded to Major League Base-
ball.187  In Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of 
Professional Base Ball Clubs, plaintiffs brought an antitrust action arguing 
that the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs had violated antitrust 
provisions through the monopolization of the sport.188  Resolving the dispute 
in favor of the defendants, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, held that 
Major League Baseball was exempt from antitrust violations.189  He reasoned 
that Major League Baseball was a truly “state affair” and did not qualify as a 
regulated business for antitrust purposes.190  In 1952, this decision was af-
firmed under stare decisis.  While baseball’s market had changed to where it 
was easily  
characterized as national rather than purely state, the Court continued to hold 
the exception valid.191  In 1998, this exception became a congressional stat-
ute.192  Although this exception was never expanded to other American 
sports,193 it  
provides an easy example of how the “sporting exception” analog exists in 
American sports law. 
With this background, these state-contract lawsuits to enforce contracts 
that extend beyond the CBA’s expiration are surely a sporting exception ana-
log as no other industry would have the same capacity to bring suit.194  This is 
                                                            
187. There is an entire book recently published thoroughly explaining this exemption.  See gener-
ally STUART BANNER, THE BASEBALL TRUST: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 
(2013).  In this easy to read monograph, Professor Banner provides a detailed and well-delineated  
discussion of baseball’s antitrust exception. 
188. Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 
207 (1922). 
189. Id. at 208. 
190. Id. (“The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state affairs.  It is true 
that in order to attain for these exhibitions the great popularity that they have achieved, competitions 
must be arranged between clubs from different cities and States.  But the fact that in order to give the 
exhibitions the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for 
their doing so is not enough to change the character of the business.”). 
191. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).   
192. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998).  This act was named af-
ter the famous Curt Flood, who challenged the exception’s validity in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 
(1972). 
193. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 447 (1957) (holding that the exception does not extend to 
the NFL). 
194. This sporting exception idea could also become significant even if the court would determine 
that the federal labor law preempts these claims.  As Geier v. American. Honda Motor Co., explains, 
the Supreme Court is willing to consider preemption waiver if the conflict does not extend far.  See 
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 871−72 (2000).  This section will prove that this 
exception would only extend to professional sports and more exclusively to football in North Ameri-
ca.  
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a result of two unique features of the professional sporting market: 1) long-
term,  
individualized contracts that extend well beyond the CBA’s expiration; and 2) 
lack of comparable employment in North America.   
First, the long-term contracts are certainly unique to professional sports.  
As the introduction explains, Eli Manning signed a huge contract extension 
with the CBA expiration looming.195  This would certainly never happen in 
another industry for two reasons: first, no other industry, besides possibly oth-
er  
entertainment personnel, would sign individualized contracts; and second, the 
employment contracts would unilaterally expire at the CBA’s expiration.  For 
example, any conventional laborer would never sign an individualized contract 
nor negotiate his or her salary.196  These terms would be entirely fixed within 
the CBA terms.  Furthermore, when the CBA expires, these laborers would not 
rightfully have an action because their “contract,” the provisions fixed within 
the CBA, would ultimately lapse with the expiration.  Therefore, the normal 
laborer, unlike professional athletes, would resemble the great majority of  
individuals that are considered unionized employment.197   
Second, professional sports athletes, specifically NFL athletes, are unable 
to find comparable employment.  Continuing the example above, the normal 
laborer, if locked out by their employer, would ultimately seek new  
employment.  While it may be hard to find the exact same type of employ-
ment, they certainly would try to find comparable employment.  This is not the 
case for NFL players.  Once the owners lock them out, many of these individ-
uals are at a loss.  They have relied on such extravagant lifestyles that they are 
left to pick up the pieces when the huge paychecks cease to be deposited.  
Therefore, these individuals would be more willing to risk these state-contract-
law claims rather than seek comparable employment.198  For example, NFL 
                                                            
195. See Vacchiano, supra note 8. 
196. This is known through personal experience.  My mother works at a paper mill where the  
relationship with her employer is controlled by a CBA.   
197. For example, most unionized pipe fitters, welders, and other laborers would certainly not 
have an individualized contract and their compensation would be based on a fixed agreement between 
the  
employer and union.  Throughout the rest of this section, these individuals are coined “normal labor-
ers.”  This connection is not meant to spark any resentment; however it is meant to show a difference 
between normal labor negotiations and professional athletes.   
198. For example, my mother, and many other unionized laborers, would not have the means to 
front a state-contract-law claim even if it was afforded.  Furthermore, this distinction eliminates the 
entertainment industry personnel that could possibly have a long-term, individualized contract.  These 
individuals would likely seek other comparable employment, such as another movie role, rather than 
waste time and resources to seek these contract claims. 
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players’ only resort in North America would be the Canadian Football League 
(CFL).   
Unfortunately, the CFL provides at least two significant obstacles.  First, the 
pay would be greatly decreased.  Many NFL players would be unwilling to 
risk their NFL contracts, once the lockout is lifted, in order to pursue such a  
decreased salary.  Second, and most significant, the CFL itself implements a 
“non-import player ratio.”199  This ratio limits the number of non-Canadian 
players that each team can have on its active roster and starting lineup.200  Due 
to this ratio, the CFL teams would be unwilling to take a risk on these NFL 
players.  For example, in order to sign an NFL player, a CFL club would have 
to cut one of its non-Canadian players.  Furthermore, it may have to rearrange 
the starting lineup in order to comply with the ratio.  While this NFL player 
could provide a huge reward, the risk would be equally as daunting.  As soon 
as the lockout is lifted, the NFL player would likely leave to seek his past  
employment.  This would result in harmed relations with the roster players 
with truly no reward.  
In the end, these state-contract-law claims are clearly a “sporting excep-
tion” analog.  As this section provides, this exception would only apply to  
professional sports athletes and particularly athletes, such as NFL players, who 
could not find comparable employment. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
While the 2011 CBA resulted in arguably unfavorable terms for players, 
this article has provided a legal mechanism to ensure that future CBAs could 
be negotiated more favorably.201  At the outset, this article posed a hypothet-
ical scenario where it questioned the ability of the Manning brothers to bring  
state-contract-law claims during the 2011 lockout.  After reading this article, it  
becomes clear that Eli and Peyton would have a strong likelihood of success 
bringing a state-contract-law claim.202  If this is correct, players with valid 
player contracts would be allowed to bring suit against the NFL teams.  By us-
ing this mechanism, the NFL teams would be required to return to the bargain-
                                                            
199. See e.g., Game Rule Ratio, CANADIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.cfl.ca/game-rule-
ratio/ (last visited May 15, 2017). 
200. Id. 
201. This article does not, however, make a conclusion about how this legal mechanism will play 
out or unfold.  For example, it is not entirely implausible to believe that the NFL teams may choose a 
strategy to pay these contracted players in order to maintain a significant edge in the collective  
bargaining process. 
202. While a debate can occur on whether a single state presents the best likelihood of success, 
this debate would provide little to this article.  It would only take one successful suit on behalf of any 
player for the negotiation process to shift. 
GANN 27.2 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/17  9:59 AM 
424 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:2 
ing table and negotiate a fair CBA.  While the jury is still out on the signifi-
cance of this article’s legal mechanism concerning the NFL labor negotiation 
context, one thing will remain certain: this article has presented NFL players 
with a  
significant legal strategy that has never been used in the past.  
As the famous sports figure, John Wooden, stated, “Failing to prepare is 
preparing to fail.”203  With that in mind, this article’s goal is to prepare NFL 
players for the probable future CBA expiration.  In order to accomplish this 
feat, a thorough analysis of federal labor law preemption history and an argu-
ment to prove that federal law does not preempt state contract law in the NFL 
player contract setting was presented.  With federal labor preemption unlikely, 
this  
article suggests that NFL players could regain market power in the collective 
bargaining process.  Furthermore, this article provided an analytical frame-
work to prove that these state-law-contract lawsuits are a “sporting exception” 
analog.  In the end, the success of this article will depend on whether an NFL 
player decides to pursue it as a strategy; still, such pursuit does not discount 
the  
availability of this game-changing strategy for all professional sports in the  
future. 
 
                                                            
203. Robert Buderi, Failing to Prepare Is Preparing to Fail, and Other John Wooden Advice for 
the Innovation Community (and Everyone Else), XCONOMY (June 7, 2010), 
http://www.xconomy.com/boston/2010/06/07/failing-to-prepare-is-preparing-to-fail-and-other-john-
wooden-advice-for-the-innovation-community-and-everyone-else/. 
